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It is now widely acknowledged in policy and practice that the individual with dementia retains the status 
of a person and the essence of selfhood, has the right to be heard, and has the capacity to live well with 
the disabilities that dementia brings, given appropriate support. Nevertheless, negative assumptions 
about dementia as a ‘loss of self’ and a ‘living death’ remain influential. This chapter examines research 
evidence that can provide a foundation for a psychologically minded approach to dementia care and 
help to create a more constructive view of what it means to live with dementia. In this chapter findings 
are drawn from projects conducted by the Research in Ageing and Cognitive Health (REACH) group at 
Bangor University, UK on awareness, self-concept, identity and the experience of dementia for people 
across the dementia trajectory. The REACH group is now at the University of Exeter, UK.
INTRODUCTION
The stigmatisation and objectification of dementia often stems from a belief that people with dementia 
have lost global awareness and their whole sense of self. This chapter aims to establish the foundation 
for a psychologically minded approach to dementia care and create a more constructive view of what it 
means to live with dementia. After touching on the negative assumptions about dementia, an understand-
ing of the nature of awareness and self will be outlined. These two frameworks will be used to discuss 
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the experience of awareness and identity in early-stage, moderate and severe dementia. The evidence 
cited in this chapter will originate predominately from research conducted by the Research in Ageing and 
Cognitive Health (REACH) group at Bangor University, U.K. involving people with dementia and their 
caregivers. The REACH group conducts research relevant to maintaining health in later life and living 
well with dementia and associated conditions. This research draws on concepts, theories and methods 
from clinical psychology, social gerontology, neuropsychology, and neuro-rehabilitation.
Awareness can be defined as a reasonable or realistic perception or appraisal of a given aspect of 
one’s situation, functioning or performance, or of the resulting implications. In this chapter we outline 
the Levels of Awareness framework, which is useful for conceptualising and understanding the nature 
of awareness in dementia. In the Levels of Awareness framework, awareness is considered as operating 
at four levels of increasing complexity: sensory registration, performance monitoring, evaluative judge-
ment, and meta-representation. Research conducted by the REACH group has focussed on awareness 
in various stages of the dementia trajectory. Additionally, theories of the multifaceted nature of self will 
be discussed to enable dementia-related changes in self-identity to be explored.
The experience of early-stage dementia will be discussed with reference to awareness, psychologi-
cal adjustment, self-concept, and maintaining a valued identity. While some researchers have argued 
that self and identity diminish or are lost as the disease progresses, early evidence from intervention 
studies suggest that there are opportunities to support self and identity in people with dementia. This 
has important implications for how we can improve the experience of living with dementia and tailor 
interventions to provide person-centred care. The experience of living with moderate-to-severe dementia 
will also be considered in relation to self, identity and awareness. Understanding awareness can provide 
a route to enhancing the experience of people with severe or end-stage dementia. In an intervention 
study (AwareCare), care home staff were asked about their perceptions of residents’ awareness and it 
was found that training staff to observe and identify signs of awareness at the sensory and perceptual 
level can improve residents’ quality of life.
This chapter will conclude by considering ways of building on retained awareness and supporting 
self-concept and sense of identity to illustrate how a psychological approach can assist people to live 
well with dementia across the disease trajectory.
BACKGROUND
Negative Assumptions about Dementia
The term dementia comes from the Latin and literally means “out of mind” or a state of having lost one’s 
mind (Herskovits, 1995). Many negative consequences follow a diagnosis of dementia but some of those 
which can be overlooked include the medicalisation, stigmatisation and objectification of the person with 
the condition. For instance, when discussing the impact of the condition, the focus is often on the experi-
ence of caregivers, namely the burden experienced while providing care for the person with dementia. 
There is often little consideration of what impact this discussion has on the person with dementia. Ad-
ditionally, in dementia, the self can be affected by stigma as well as by consequences of the illness, and 
factors such as personality and life history are often not considered when interacting with the person with 
dementia, which can have a negative impact on self-efficacy (Sabat, 1994). This issue has been given 
prominence in the theory of malignant social psychology (e.g., Kitwood & Bredin, 1992). In Kitwood’s 
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dialectical model of dementia (see Figure 1), the experience of dementia is influenced by the interaction 
of biological factors (i.e., neurological impairment) and psychosocial factors (i.e., the interpersonal en-
vironment). Negative discourses direct attention away from the research evidence: People with dementia 
can retain substantial strengths, abilities and cognitive functions (Herskovits, 1995; Petrescu, MacFarlane, 
& Ranzijn, 2014). An alternative positive discourse, founded on a social interactionist perspective, can 
provide the foundation for social scientists to reframe and reclaim the “self” in dementia (Herskovits, 
1995). It is important that such a psychologically minded approach to dementia care is taken; indeed, 
there is evidence that the brain’s potential for change (plasticity) is retained in dementia, although the 
extent of change may depend on individual factors (Fernández-Ballesteros, Zamarrón, Tàrraga, Moya, 
& Iñiguez, 2003). Evidence for this alternative discourse is the subject of this chapter.
Levels of Awareness Framework and Theory of Self
In order to reframe and reclaim the self in dementia, it is first necessary to consider the nature of aware-
ness and the self.
Awareness
Awareness can be defined as a reasonable or realistic perception or appraisal of a given aspect of one’s 
situation, functioning or performance, or of the resulting implications, which may be expressed explicitly 
or implicitly (Clare, Rowlands, Bruce, Surr, & Downs, 2008). Awareness is not a unitary function and 
can be considered to operate at four levels of increasing complexity, as outlined in the Levels of Aware-
ness framework (Clare, Marková, Roth, & Morris, 2011) described below.
Sensory registration consists of internal representations that enable attentional resources to be di-
rected towards specific objects. These simple representations underpin more complex manifestations of 
awareness. The environmental and social stimuli available will determine what opportunity people have 
to register and express sensory behaviour (Clare, Marková et al., 2011). It is this level of awareness that 
is witnessed when people respond to environmental and social stimuli.
Figure 1. Dialectical model of dementia
(Based on Kitwood, 1997)
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Performance monitoring builds on sensory registration by involving the monitoring of ongoing 
task performance. This occurs when people compare expected and actual outcomes and evaluate how 
successful actions have been. However, this domain of awareness may still be relatively circumscribed 
(Clare, Marková et al., 2011). For instance, performance monitoring could be as rudimentary as lifting 
a cup to the mouth and realising that the cup is not heading towards the intended target, or as complex 
as monitoring how well one is performing on a mental arithmetic task.
Evaluative judgement includes a person’s general awareness of any symptoms, changes or impairments 
in his/her abilities, or of his/her functioning or situation. These judgements are more varied and compos-
ite in nature than performance monitoring, as judgements will depend on how changes are registered, 
personality attributes and past experience, as well as social and cultural factors (Clare, Marková et al., 
2011). For example, a person might evaluate how well he/she completed a cognitive test by considering 
his/her score in light of how he/she recalls performing on the measure before, how well he/she believes 
other people perform, and his/her view of him/herself as a competent, capable individual.
Meta-representation is the most complex level of awareness and incorporates self-reflections that 
rely on personal knowledge and experience as well as on the perspectives of others. Again the social and 
environmental situation can influence how much support is provided for this reflective process (Clare, 
Marková et al., 2011). For instance, it will be hard to demonstrate meta-representational awareness if 
there is no opportunity to discuss, ponder and reflect with others.
There may be interactions between these levels of awareness and people may not operate at the same 
level of awareness in all domains. For example, someone may show a meta-representational awareness 
of his/her current emotions but only operate at the performance monitoring stage when considering 
how well he/she does on cognitive testing. Therefore, it may not be valid to generalise between levels 
or between domains of awareness (Clare, Marková et al., 2011). Consequently, the relationship between 
level of cognitive decline and degree of awareness is not straightforward (Clare, Rowlands, Bruce et al., 
2008). Researching this field is complicated; many research designs rely on participants having sensory 
registration (i.e., a basic concept of their position and relationship to the environment) as this is neces-
sary in order to interact with the researcher and study materials (Caddell & Clare, 2013).
The Self
Self can be defined as personal identity or a continuity of one’s point of view, and this can be drawn 
from multiple public personae (Herskovits, 1995). From a social constructionist perspective the self is 
not unitary. Harré’s (1998) theory highlighted three modes of self which, as in the case of awareness, 
can be considered to be operating at different levels of complexity, as described below.
Self-1 is seen when a person identifies him/herself as a unique individual with an embodied viewpoint. 
For instance, most people talk in terms of “I” and “my.” This sense of self is less fluid than the more 
complex representations below. Sabat argued that people in the moderate-to-severe stages of dementia 
frequently use personal pronouns and demonstrate a sense of personal identity (Sabat, 2002; Sabat & 
Collins, 1999; Sabat & Harré, 1992).
Self-2 is evident when a person talks about his/her personal experiences and history, personal attributes 
and beliefs. This self is influenced by the comments of others, and a person’s sense of his/her personal 
attributes can change over time depending on the social and environmental feedback he/she receives.
Self-3 is the social persona, the self which is presented to others at any given time point. This self 
can have multiple facets and will change according to the context and situation, as it is constantly recon-
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structed in interactions with other people. This means that in order for a person with dementia to present 
a positive identity to others, the cooperation of these others is required. Work by Sabat has shown that 
some people with dementia do express multiple personae. For example, one participant, I.R., constructed 
her identity as a helper and nurturer, as well as a confused dementia sufferer (Sabat & Harré, 1992), 
while another participant, Dr. M., described herself as having dementia as well as being an academic 
and a social worker (Sabat, 2002).
It can be difficult to tease apart these different types of self because the self is experienced as a single 
entity (Caddell & Clare, 2013). In research, self-1 (which recognises the self as a unique embodied indi-
vidual) will be exhibited by many participants even if this is not what is being explicitly tested (Caddell 
& Clare, 2013). However, self-2 and self-3 can only be examined if participants communicate about these 
to the researcher. This can be done indirectly. For instance, in order to complete many questionnaires 
it is necessary for participants to have a “private self” that is intact to at least some degree (Caddell & 
Clare, 2013).
Although some research focuses on the loss of awareness and self in people with dementia, findings 
from studies by the REACH group suggest that there are opportunities to support these in people with 




Extent of Retained Awareness
Much of current literature on awareness in early-stage dementia demonstrates inconsistent findings due 
to variations in the methodologies employed across studies, the conceptualisation of awareness, the ob-
ject of awareness selected, and the type of assessment measurement used (Clare, Whitaker et al., 2011).
One line of investigation has been to compare self-ratings and informant ratings. Nelis et al. (2011) 
demonstrated that people with dementia have a tendency to rate themselves significantly higher compared 
to caregivers in empathetic skills, relationship skills and social behaviour. Traditionally, such a discrep-
ancy has been taken as evidence of impaired awareness, but such studies typically have not considered 
either how caregivers who provide ratings are functioning socially, or how the person with dementia 
was considered to function in these domains premorbidly. The findings from these types of studies are 
also inconsistent; some comparisons of self-ratings and proxy ratings have indicated that people with 
early-stage dementia can have a relatively accurate appraisal of their traits (Caddell & Clare, 2012).
Another research approach has been to compare self-ratings to objective measures of performance. 
Self-rated functioning is associated with immediate memory performance, demonstrating that people 
with early-stage dementia can have a degree of functional awareness (Martyr, Nelis, & Clare, 2014). In 
another study, self-ratings of functioning in instrumental activities of daily living were compared to letter 
fluency ability (the ability to generate words beginning with a specified letter). People who had letter 
fluency scores in the impaired range rated themselves as experiencing greater difficulties in their daily 
functioning (Martyr et al., 2012). This suggests that difficulties in expressive language may contribute 
to better awareness.
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The Memory Impairment and Dementia Awareness Study (MIDAS) was a multimethod longitudinal 
exploration of awareness in people with early-stage dementia. Assessments were undertaken at base-
line, and then 12 and 20 months later. In the initial phase of the study, a cross-sectional analysis was 
conducted using questionnaire data. It was found that the extent of participants’ awareness differed in 
relation to the different domains considered (Clare, Whitaker et al., 2011). For instance, one method 
of measuring awareness involved using vignettes describing people with no, very-early-stage and more 
established dementia (Clare, Nelis, Martyr, Whitaker et al., 2012). Vignettes enable participants to retain 
some distance from the subject matter and people’s responses to vignettes can provide insight into their 
understanding and the beliefs that underlie their conceptualisations. The majority of MIDAS participants 
correctly classified the established dementia vignette as reflecting either dementia or memory loss and 
some suggested actions that the character in the vignette could take to improve the situation. A minority 
(23%) self-referenced their own memory problems when responding to the vignette, and this included 
36% of people who were classified as showing limited awareness on other measures. These findings 
suggest that the majority of people with early-stage dementia can distinguish between normal ageing 
and dementia and are aware of the signs of dementia in others.
Another measure used in the MIDAS study was an in-depth interview with participants in which 
they were asked about their experience of having memory problems. On this measure, participants’ re-
sponses reflected their meta-representations in relation to themselves and their situation. Participants’ 
performance on the vignette measure (described above) was moderately correlated with scores on this 
in-depth interview. However, it was participants’ meta-representational capacity (as tapped in the in-depth 
interview) which seemed to determine what suggestions participants were able to give in response to 
the vignette; those rated as having limited or no meta-representational awareness were less able to offer 
advice to the character depicted in the vignette (Clare, Nelis, Martyr, Whitaker et al., 2012).
The findings from the MIDAS study suggest that although different awareness phenomena are inter-
related, awareness should be seen as specific to a given level, domain and measurement method. Further 
support for this conclusion comes from studies of implicit awareness. For example, Martyr et al. (2011) 
found that participants with dementia had greater reaction times to dementia-related, and hence emotion-
ally salient, words on the emotional Stroop task. This effect was not related to their degree of awareness 
of their diagnosis, so implicit awareness can still be elicited even when explicit awareness is diminished.
Relationship to Degree of Cognitive Impairment
There has also been substantial interest in exploring whether awareness and cognitive functioning are 
related. Some studies have found that people with limited awareness have more severe cognitive defi-
cits (Hurt et al., 2010). However, psychological and social factors also significantly influence level of 
awareness, alongside illness-related and neuropsychological factors. Relevant factors include mood, 
self-concept and personality, although patterns of association may vary across the different domains of 
awareness (Clare, Nelis, Martyr, Roberts et al., 2012).
One study that considered the relationship between cognitive impairment and awareness in detail 
was conducted by Naylor and Clare (2008). They assessed 29 people with early-stage dementia on 
standardised measures of autobiographical memory, identity and awareness of memory functioning. 
Participants had a mean score of 22 out of 30 on the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE: Folstein, 
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Folstein, & McHugh, 1975), but the range of scores was 16 to 29, indicating that some participants may 
have been moderately impaired. The researchers found that participants’ level of cognitive functioning 
did not significantly affect scores on measures of identity or awareness.
Self
Awareness and Self-Identity
Naylor and Clare (2008) also considered the relationship between identity and awareness. Participants 
who demonstrated less awareness, as indicated by ratings that were more discrepant from those of in-
formants, had a more positive and definite sense of identity. This was not the association expected, and 
Naylor and Clare suggested several explanations for these findings. Perhaps people with poorer semantic 
(factual) memory were less able to search their episodic (event-based) memory for information with 
which to answer questions on an identity questionnaire. This would mean they might be responding to 
the questions on the basis of one or two pertinent incidents that they could still recall. There was some 
evidence to support this conclusion. Participants who showed higher awareness, as indicated by a lower 
discrepancy between self-ratings and informant ratings of current memory functioning, could recall a 
greater number of personal incidents from their midlife period (i.e., their more recent past). However, 
there are alternative explanations. For example, participants’ reports might have reflected a psychological 
defence designed to protect themselves against distress. A final possibility is that, if participants were 
less able to update their episodic memory, they might have felt more definite about their identity because 
they would not have gone through the difficult process of trying to integrate their changed functioning 
into their self-concept.
Other studies have reported similar findings. The MIDAS study also employed questionnaires that 
included items about participants’ self-concept as well as their perception of their abilities in various 
domains of functioning including memory, functional abilities, and social skills. Stronger self-concept 
was associated with higher self-ratings of memory and social functioning and with poorer awareness 
(Clare, Nelis, Martyr, Whitaker et al., 2012). These authors favoured the explanation that participants 
with less awareness had greater difficulty updating their view of themselves and their attributes (self-2) 
in the light of new environmental and social information. This pattern has been described as adopting 
a self-maintaining coping style, though sometimes the implication of this term is that participants use 
this style, consciously or unconsciously, as a psychological defence. Coping style is thought to lie on a 
continuum, with self-maintaining strategies and self-adjusting strategies as polar opposites (Clare, 2003). 
People who employ self-maintaining strategies aim to keep things the same as before, while people who 
utilise self-adjustment strategies try to integrate change into an adjusted sense of self. The negative views 
of others and the limited opportunities people with dementia have to present their sense of self serve as 
additional constraints to adopting self-adjusting strategies (Sabat, 2001).
Relationship to Degree of Cognitive Impairment
The explanation endorsed by Clare, Nelis, Martyr, Whitaker et al. (2012) regarding the relationship be-
tween self-concept and awareness has some support from an analysis of the longitudinal data from the 
MIDAS study (Clare, Whitaker, Nelis et al., 2013). In the time three (20-month follow-up) data, poorer 
memory performance was again associated with more positive self-concept ratings. However, at this 
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final time point, the mean cognitive screening score on the MMSE for the sample remained in the mild 
impairment range at 22 out of 30 and, over the 20 months of the study, participants’ self-concept ratings 
were fairly stable and comparable to those of the general population. This suggests that self-concept does 
not change as a straightforward result of dementia-related memory decline. For people with dementia, 
lower self-concept ratings were associated with higher levels of depression and anxiety.
Characteristics of Sense of Identity
The majority of research has, however, considered what forms of identity people with early-stage dementia 
hold. Caddell and Clare (2011b) investigated whether people with dementia thought their identity had 
changed post-diagnosis and whether they believed their identity might be affected in the future by their 
dementia. Five women and five men took part in semi-structured interviews. Self-1, self-2 and self-3 
were evident in the responses of these participants.
The interviews showed that in early-stage dementia, identity remained multifaceted: People referred 
to personality traits, relationships, activities, attitudes, beliefs and opinions when they talked about im-
portant aspects of their selfhood. These are some examples of how participants described themselves: 
“I consider myself a reasonable person you know, I get on with most people” (Caddell & Clare, 2011b, 
p. 384), “No problem, we still go to church on a regular basis, and er, I - no, it hasn’t affected anything 
like that” (p. 385), and “I’m just an ordinary mum, you know, and grandmother . . . I think I haven’t 
changed” (p. 387).
Most participants held a particular self-concept or identity and thought this was mostly unchanged 
since the onset of dementia. Only one respondent thought she had become a different person. None of the 
respondents talked about changes in their attitudes, opinions, beliefs or preferences. Some respondents 
did refer to changes such as symptoms and emotional reactions to dementia, but they indicated that these 
did not affect their identity: “The only thing that does affect me is that sometimes when I go shopping 
for more than one item, I tend to forget some of them” (Caddell & Clare, 2011b, p. 390).
In another interview study, Werezak and Stewart (2002) found evidence of similar sentiments expressed 
by participants. These authors considered how six respondents learned to live with early-stage dementia. 
Interviews highlighted five stages of adjustment: antecedents (recognising there is a memory problem); 
anticipation (expecting a diagnosis and considering future losses); appearance (becoming aware that 
others are noticing the memory loss); assimilation (fitting dementia into one’s inner and outer world), 
and acceptance (coming to a position where the remainder of life can be enjoyed). During the appear-
ance stage, respondents noticed their memory problems yet described seeing themselves as the same.
Further support for a continuing sense of identity in early-stage dementia comes from an intervention 
study that provided a series of poetry writing workshops for people with early-stage dementia (Petrescu 
et al., 2014). Four women took part and what emerged most strongly in the poetry produced was the 
women’s insistence on their maintained sense of self; these writers portrayed a strong sense of present 
identity in their poems.
Finally, a study with members of the Dementia Advocacy and Support Network International (DASNI) 
conducted by Clare, Rowlands, and Quin (2008) used a longitudinal design to explore how identity 
changed and how it was supported in early-stage dementia. DASNI is an internet-based self-help and 
mutual support network for people with a diagnosis of dementia. Over two years, semi-structured inter-
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views were conducted with seven group members about their experiences and views. Clare, Rowlands, 
and Quin (2008) found that part of the participants’ journey postdiagnosis had been to regain a clear 
sense of identity. When these participants talked about their current situation, most expressed a strong 
sense of identity and self-acceptance:
I have always been a person who has wanted to make a difference in the world and through DASNI I feel 
that I have been able to change a small part of the way some people think about early-stage dementia. 
(Clare, Rowlands, & Quin, 2008, p. 20)
There seems, therefore, to be evidence that self-1, self-2 and self-3 continue to operate in early-stage 
dementia.
Changes in Identity
Caddell and Clare (2011b) did find, however, that there was tension in respondents’ accounts. Although 
many said their daily lives continued as usual, they concurrently identified ways in which they had had 
to adapt: “Well, as my memory’s got worse and worse, erm . . . I’ve - I’ve become less and less involved 
in things going on” (Caddell & Clare, 2011b, p. 309). One respondent who said she had not changed 
as a person also described feeling that something had changed. This may represent some dissonance in 
self-3, the social personae, that respondents wanted to present in the interview.
Similarly, in the DASNI study (Clare, Rowlands, & Quin, 2008), respondents did report some changes 
occurring in their identity. Compared to their sense of self and identity before the onset of dementia, 
respondents commented that they believed part of themselves had indeed been lost. This was especially 
the case if respondents had retired because of dementia: “I had to give up my job, this was a devastating 
loss. It was essentially how I had defined myself” (Clare, Rowlands, & Quin, 2008, p. 17). The difference 
in emphasis from Caddell and Clare (2011b) may be due to the fact that the participants in the DASNI 
study were relatively young (age range: 48-66 years) and at this life stage the changes necessitated by 
declining cognition, such as retirement or changed family commitments, might have been particularly 
pertinent to their sense of identity.
Some of the differences in participant reports may also be related to respondents being at different 
stages in the process of adjusting to and accepting a dementia diagnosis. Werezak and Stewart (2002) 
highlighted the five stages of adjustment: antecedents, anticipation, appearance, assimilation, and ac-
ceptance. In particular, assimilation was an important stage of the process. Assimilation referred to the 
continual process that respondents described of fitting dementia into daily life. This included assimilat-
ing their thoughts and feelings about the disease. All of the respondents in the study by Werezak and 
Stewart described achieving some degree of acceptance of their dementia and stated that they were able 
to focus on enjoying the remainder of their lives. This suggests that the end result of changes to identity 
need not be negative.
Maintaining Sense of Identity
In the interviews conducted by Caddell and Clare (2011b), respondents were also asked about what 
they believed would happen to their sense of identity in the future. The majority of respondents did not 
think they would change in the future and expressed a desire not to change: “If I haven’t changed since 
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(childhood), I’m not likely to change again now am I?” (Caddell & Clare, 2011b, p. 389). However, 
most respondents also described uncertainty about what to expect. Participants did fear losing abilities 
that contributed to their current sense of identity, and several linked this threat to a potential deteriora-
tion of their dementia: “I’m hoping they’ll find something that will stop it deteriorating . . . I dread the 
thought of it getting worse . . . you know, if I couldn’t communicate” (Caddell & Clare, 2011b, p. 388).
Steeman, Tournoy, Grypdonck, Godderis, and Dierckx De Casterlé (2013) utilised a longitudinal 
design to explore how identity was maintained in early-stage dementia. They interviewed 20 people with 
early-stage dementia four times over a period of 13.5 months. Stage of dementia was determined using 
the Clinical Dementia Rating (CDR) and at baseline participants had a CDR of either 0.5 (questionable 
dementia) or 1 (mild dementia). In the initial interviews participants spoke about being valued for what 
they did, and their current functioning was an important element in this identity construction: “Yes, that 
is vanity, that is vanity, is it not. I still work for a firm in N. and now and then I still play a little bit the 
role of consultant, adviser” (Steeman et al., 2013, p. 225).
At the final interview 11 participants remained in the questionable or mild dementia range. At this 
time, participants talked more about being valued for who they were and reflected this with stories 
about their personal characteristics, although they could still base their current sense of value on past 
achievements. This pattern of shifting focus for identity was evident in 13 participants and seemed to 
be triggered by cognitive decline and increased dependency. Steeman et al. (2013) provided two case 
studies to demonstrate this pattern. These are briefly described below.
Liza had a baseline MMSE score of 25 and talked of how she was able to function and manage: “I 
always have a notebook here, in which I write down everything, if I need something in the kitchen or so. 
And then it is not so difficult to do the shopping” (Steeman et al., 2013, p. 229). At the final interview 
Liza maintained a CDR of 0.5 but was much more dependent on the help of others. In this interview she 
linked her positive identity to her view that she still had control over who she was, what she wanted and 
what she felt: “I believe I still have sound wisdom” (Steeman et al., 2013, p. 230).
Another participant was Terry. She had a baseline MMSE score of 21 and a CDR score of 0.5. In 
the initial interviews she emphasised her autonomy, which she related to her continued ability to drive:
I’m not a valetudinarian yet. And I still drive the car well. My daughter told me I’d better sell the car. 
. . . But if I don’t have a car, then I’ll feel hey hey (grumbling). Then I’m a mere nobody. That’s what I 
think of it. (Steeman et al., 2013, p. 233)
At her third interview Terry had maintained her CDR and MMSE scores but her doctor had advised 
her to stop driving. Despite Terry’s concern that such an occurrence would negatively impact her iden-
tity, this was not actually the case as instead she emphasised her soundness of mind in taking no risks 
and in saving money:
Yes, that’s what he said. But I was going to get rid of the car anyway. My son gave it to me and it stands 
still a lot, losing value each day. It’s too stupid that I [would] still [have a car]. . . . It’s gone now; I guess 
it has been 14 days or three weeks. But I really don’t notice it. No, I’m still, uh, I’m still very careful. I 
don’t believe that it, uh. The doctor maybe does it because he has to, if they ever would say something. 
They can probably determine it precisely how I was, should I have an accident. It would be too stupid, 
wouldn’t it? And also, for the little bit that I was driving. No, no, I’m not going to lose any sleep over 
it. (Steeman et al., 2013, p. 234)
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Obviously in early-stage dementia, in particular, people often have identities as part of a married 
couple as well as single identities. Davies (2011) explored this in joint interviews with couples where 
one spouse had been diagnosed with early-stage dementia. These respondents did not expect that their 
marriage commitment would be disrupted by the process of dementia, but they did understand that 
changes might arise in their roles and responsibilities.
Having an identity as a couple meant that participants talked in terms of living with and responding 
to the changes dementia brought as a couple. This was illustrated by one caregiver who, although he 
had to take on more of a supporting role, still described himself and his wife as doing things together:
But we had to do a couple of chores in the morning so we did it together and then I sort of say, “Okay, 
we’re going to bring the car in for a tune-up. We have to go to the bank,” and “I’ll write it down for the 
day, and then you do the laundry.” So we cross out the other day before ‘cause that’s all she needs to 
do is focus on that day. And that’s what she does. She took the laundry down. She washed it. She ironed 
it. (Davies, 2011, p. 228)
This identity of “couplehood” was also evident in a third theme in the interviews conducted by Davies 
(2011) that focused on resilience. Couples reported a continuing caring relationship that was resilient to 
the problems of early-stage dementia, and thus they maintained continuity in their marital relationship 
and maintained the “married” identity.
Psychological Adjustment
From the proceeding discussion it is evident that many people with early-stage dementia need to adjust 
and compensate for changes in their identity. This can have psychological consequences and there has 
been interest in how people with early-stage dementia manage and cope and how this relates to their 
awareness and sense of self. This research will be briefly reviewed before the moderate and severe stages 
of dementia are considered.
Self
The changes and strategies people employ to maintain a valued identity underscore how important 
identity is to psychological well-being. Caddell and Clare (2012) explored how different aspects of 
identity related to mood and quality of life in early-stage dementia. Using a cross-sectional analysis of 
questionnaire measures, they found that higher scores on identity-related variables were associated with 
fewer anxiety and depression symptoms, as well as better quality of life.
The analysis of the longitudinal MIDAS data also demonstrated that self-concept was an independent 
predictor of quality of life in early-stage dementia. However, this relationship was partially mediated by 
participants’ depression and anxiety scores (Clare, Whitaker, Nelis et al., 2013). A recent analysis of the 
overall MIDAS data used bivariate correlation and regression analyses (Woods et al., 2014) and found 
that self-concept made a strong, independent contribution to quality of life.
However, the association between psychological well-being and identity may be mediated by addi-
tional factors. For instance, it could be that the participants showing this pattern had less severe cognitive 
problems, as autobiographical and personal semantic memory are thought to play a part in the formation 
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of identity (Massimi et al., 2008). Additionally, the MIDAS study data (Clare, Nelis, Martyr, Whitaker 
et al., 2012) and findings from the study by Naylor and Clare (2008) would suggest that awareness may 
also be a mediating factor.
Awareness
There have been mixed findings about the relationship between awareness and psychological adjustment. 
Initial studies found that health-related quality of life did not differ according to level of awareness in 
people with mild dementia. This was taken as evidence that limited awareness might not always func-
tion as a protective factor (Hurt et al., 2010). For instance, Werezak and Stewart (2002) considered that 
awareness impacted on the antecedent stage of adjusting to a dementia diagnosis, as participants had 
to become aware of their memory problems to start the acceptance trajectory. However, recent studies 
have not always supported these initial ideas.
Participants in the MIDAS study who had low levels of awareness reported significantly less anxi-
ety than those with higher awareness scores (Clare, Whitaker et al., 2011). The relationship between 
awareness and emotional well-being was explored further in a recent secondary analysis of the MIDAS 
data (Woods et al., 2014). Few of the awareness measures emerged as significant predictors of quality 
of life. However, the discrepancy between how the person with dementia evaluated his/her memory 
and the caregiver’s ratings did have a small-to-medium significant correlation with quality of life. This 
association was mediated by depression (which decreased the strength that awareness had in the regres-
sion model) and self-concept, which made a strong, independent contribution to the model (i.e., more 
positive views of self were associated with higher quality of life).
In moderate dementia, which is considered next, a similar relationship has been found between health-
related quality of life and awareness. Hurt et al. (2010) found that people with more limited awareness 




Clare, Rowlands, Bruce et al. (2008) explored the differing degrees of awareness that were manifested in 
the interactions and conversations of 81 people with dementia living in 10 different residential homes. 
On the MMSE more than half of the participants scored below 11 and the modal score was 0. However, 
all participants had some speech. The final dataset of unstructured interactions included 304 conversa-
tions with 80 participants and these were analysed using a grounded theory approach.
All participants demonstrated some degree of retained awareness. This awareness was expressed in 
relation to the self, relationships and the environment. In terms of the environment, respondents made 
comments about the weather and the home routine. For example, one participant stated, “But it’s wet 
really, out there, you know, now” (Clare, Rowlands, Bruce et al., 2008, p. 2372). However, a more 
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complex awareness was also demonstrated, with respondents expressing awareness both in relation to 
the present and past and in relation to changes that had occurred over time. One participant showed this 
awareness by saying:
Don’t do anything now . . . I used to do a lot of walking at one time, but . . . I’ve just . . . nothing’s right 
now . . . I’m not a bit like I used to be . . . not a bit like I was . . . when I first came here. (Clare, Row-
lands, Bruce et al., 2008, p. 2374)
In terms of self, awareness was shown in relation to the body, mind, emotions and actions. For ex-
ample, a female participant said, “But the pain now and again, the arm swells here and the fingers kill, 
but otherwise I’m alright” (Clare, Rowlands, Bruce et al., 2008, p. 2371). Some participants demonstrated 
this awareness through presenting themselves in particular ways or using coping strategies that attempted 
to cover up their diminished functioning, as one participant said:
Well, perhaps err . . . things have gone wrong, but I’m not gonna let on . . . They think, they think ev-
erything’s OK, but it isn’t, I’ve made a right mess of it . . . [Interviewer: And so sometimes you cover up 
when you make a mess?] Yes, I’m not honest enough, when I know I’m wrong. (Clare, Rowlands, Bruce 
et al., 2008, pp. 2373-2374)
Participants also talked about their relationships with others and showed an awareness of other 
people’s feelings and needs. Therefore, these interviews provide substantial evidence that considerable 
awareness is retained in the moderate-to-severe stages of dementia. However, there were also, as would 
be expected, some examples of unawareness and this often related to inaccurate appraisals or to difficul-
ties in making sense of the current situation (Clare, Rowlands, Bruce et al., 2008). Some participants 
confused past and present experience:
And of course I don’t know at the moment whether both my parents are living . . . I would think if any-
thing disastrous had happened I would have been told, but . . . whether they’re here or not I don’t know. 
Mystery. (Clare, Rowlands, Bruce et al., 2008, p. 2375)
When respondents’ appraisals were considered, some made inaccurate judgements about their capabili-
ties: “I’m going to get, well, I sold the other [car], I shouldn’t, don’t think I should have done, but I did, 
so I’m going to buy another one” (Clare, Rowlands, Bruce et al., 2008, p. 2374). Others had difficulty 
understanding the perspectives of others:
I shall, I shall get shot if I don’t, if I let them know what I’ve been doing . . . not getting on my way. I 
should be getting on with my work, with my work . . . I’d better go and wash up. (Clare, Rowlands, Bruce 
et al., 2008, p. 2374)
Severe Dementia
In a study by Magai, Cohen, Gomberg, Malatesta, and Culver (1996), 43 nursing home residents par-
ticipated in observational sessions. All participants had a significant level of impairment and were con-
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sidered to have severe dementia. However, even in the most impaired participants, 29% showed sadness 
that was context-dependent, that is, in very-late-stage Alzheimer’s disease, people behaved in a way that 
showed some awareness of the environment and were able to react and respond to relevant stimuli. Other 
participants were observed to express interest, happiness, fear and anger, demonstrating that emotional 
responsiveness can also be preserved in severe dementia.
Focusing on severe dementia, the AwareCare measure (Clare, Whitaker et al., 2012) was developed 
through a review of existing measures and focus groups held with staff and informal caregivers. The 
measure was refined through observations of 21 women and 19 men with severe dementia. The resulting 
responsiveness index is based on seven spontaneously occurring stimuli (such as someone being nearby) 
and three introduced stimuli (such as the person being called by name). An accompanying response 
index has 14 categories which are subdivided into movements in the eyes, face, head, arms, body and 
sounds. This measure has demonstrated face, construct and concurrent validity and there is some initial 
evidence of test retest reliability (Clare, Whitaker et al., 2012).
Observations of participants with severe dementia using the AwareCare measure have shown that 
people demonstrate the greatest responsiveness when someone is nearby or an object is introduced (Clare, 
Whitaker, Woods et al., 2013). An example provided by a care home staff member was, “Well, when I 
was giving [resident] her breakfast the other morning, she didn’t like it . . . her facial expression, I could 
tell she wasn’t keen” (Clare, Whitaker, Woods et al., 2013, p. 134). This indicates that social stimuli are 
most engaging for people with severe dementia. Participants with less severe dementia showed greater 
responsiveness, as did those with better self-care ability and greater mobility (Clare, Whitaker et al., 
2012). That participants with severe dementia were able to demonstrate retained awareness and interact 
to some extent with their environment also suggests that self-1 may be preserved into the late stages of 
dementia. Other studies have considered self-2 and self-3 towards the end of the dementia trajectory.
Self
The interviews conducted by Clare, Rowlands, Bruce et al. (2008) provide some evidence that self-2 
and self-3 can still be preserved in moderate-to-severe dementia. For instance, participants talked about 
their personal characteristics, expressed how they were feeling and what they were thinking, and talked 
about their increased dependence and lack of agency. For example, “Basically I’m a happy person, get 
worried and a bit uptight sometimes, but on the whole I enjoy life” (Clare, Rowlands, Bruce et al., 2008, 
p. 2371), and:
I say, “Well, that’s what we’ve come here for . . .” We don’t like to think of it that way, do we . . . we 
haven’t come to die, we’ve just come, we’ve got to that stage, haven’t we . . . And we need more help, we 
can’t help ourselves so much. (pp. 2371-2372)
Other studies support this conclusion that self-2 and self-3 can be preserved. Crichton and Koch 
(2007) presented a case study of a participant named Laura who had dementia. Unfortunately, they 
do not provide Laura’s MMSE score or any information about stage of dementia, but the suggestion is 
that Laura had moderate-to-severe dementia. This is based on the information that Laura had limited 
vocabulary, required a lot of assistance with activities of daily living and towards the end of the study 
she had moved to a residential home. For Laura, it seemed that it was her identity as someone who 
was in relationships with others that was important to her, as she said, “Well we’ve always got on very 
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well” (Crichton & Koch, 2007, p. 367). Laura remained aware of her previous occupational role as a 
midwife: “I used to just love delivering the babies and I did general nursing as well even though I did 
so many years of midwifery” (Crichton & Koch, 2007, p. 367). Additionally, Laura was able to identify 
previous hobbies and changes that had occurred over time: “It is annoying! Well, I used to play bowls, 
I’m not well enough to play anything or do anything much now, I just sort of sit around” (Crichton & 
Koch, 2007, p. 367).
Another study that included at least some participants with severe dementia (mean MMSE score of 
8.7) was an interview study with 38 nursing home residents (Cohen-Mansfield, Golander, & Arnheim, 
2000). Participants were asked about their occupational and family roles, what activities they liked and 
wanted to do, and what activities they could no longer do. Only 27% of respondents could not identify 
a previous occupational role (self-2) and the majority (47%) reported having been homemakers. Par-
ticipants were able to talk about a range of previous activities and personal attributes they were proud 
of. For instance, one resident spoke of pride in “speaking three languages” (Cohen-Mansfield et al., 
2000, p. 386). However, some also talked about roles they had now lost: “I used to be a famous teacher, 
a psychologist, now I am nothing” (Cohen-Mansfield et al., 2000, p. 386). When asked about family 
relationships (which could draw on self-3), 62% of participants talked about being a parent and 54% 
talked about being a son or a daughter. Additionally, 42% said being a spouse was important to them, 
31% identified themselves as grandparents, and 27% reported being a sibling.
However, Cohen-Mansfield et al. (2000) found that when they talked to staff and family members, it 
appeared that four of the residents they interviewed had provided the researcher with imaginary identi-
ties. For instance, one family member was surprised by his mother’s claim that she was a successful 
businesswoman as he remembered her as a housewife and mother. This could suggest that self-2 and 
self-3 are not always preserved as dementia progresses. Furthermore, in terms of interpreting this study’s 
findings, it should be noted that the MMSE of participants ranged from 0 to 22, so all stages of dementia 
were included and it was not possible to distinguish which responses had been made by participants with 
more moderate and severe dementia.
Improving Caregiver Perceptions of Quality of Life
During the AwareCare intervention, care staff trained in the AwareCare observation method learned 
that it was possible to detect a range of responses in residents whom they had viewed as non-responsive 
(Clare, Whitaker, Woods et al., 2013). Before the training had commenced, a typical response from a 
staff member was, “Oh no, I’ve got to observe [resident] but she doesn’t do anything, that’s gonna be 
well boring” (Clare, Whitaker, Woods et al., 2013, p. 134). However, at the end of the intervention the 
perception of specific residents had changed and a more typical reflection was, “She does respond . . . 
A lot of eye movements and turning her head, and if you suddenly touch her and she hasn’t seen you she 
jumps . . . She is very aware” (Clare, Whitaker, Woods et al., 2013, p. 134).
Researcher observations also suggested that care staff who had received the training made some posi-
tive changes in their working practices. For instance, they seemed to spend more time having conversa-
tions with residents than they had done before the training. A researcher noted that in one of the homes, 
“[Resident] was given a textured cushion and a soft toy to hold . . . [resident] was given a magazine to 
hold and look through . . . when she had the magazine she was more alert” (Clare, Whitaker, Woods et 
al., 2013, p. 136). Family caregivers thought that their relatives’ quality of life improved when staff had 
been trained with the AwareCare tool (Clare, Whitaker, Woods et al., 2013).
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SUPPORTING RETAINED AWARENESS AND SENSE OF SELF
How the findings discussed above can inform a person-centred and empowering care approach will now 
be explored.
Retained Awareness
So far, little work has been done to increase awareness in people with dementia and to inform caregiv-
ers about how to support retained awareness. While it may not be appropriate to ask the person with 
dementia to reflect on having memory difficulties, it may be beneficial to support awareness in other 
ways. Implications for care and treatment could be addressed at the various levels of awareness described 
earlier (Clare, Marková et al., 2011).
There are a number of different approaches to measuring awareness and these elicit different aspects 
of awareness. Consequently, researchers and clinicians should consider taking a multidimensional ap-
proach to assessment in order to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the person’s level of awareness 
(Clare, Whitaker et al., 2011). As previously described in this chapter, vignettes enable the person with 
dementia to demonstrate his/her knowledge and understanding of the condition and its implications, and 
can be a useful approach when evaluating individuals who experience limited explicit awareness on direct 
questioning (Clare, Nelis, Martyr, Whitaker et al., 2012). Furthermore, it is important that researchers 
outline a clear conceptual framework, provide clear operational definitions of awareness, and specify 
the object in relation to which awareness is assessed (Clare, Whitaker et al., 2011).
Sensory Registration
At the sensory registration level of awareness there needs to be sensitivity to signs of preserved pro-
cessing and the provision of an appropriate context in which to express these. The AwareCare studies 
have demonstrated the importance of appropriate interaction and environmental stimulation, as well 
as the essential role care staff play in engaging residents with severe dementia (Clare, Whitaker et al., 
2012). A facilitating environment can be provided through sensory stimulation, postural change or 
environmental adaptation (Clare, Marková et al., 2011). A review by Day, Carreon, and Stump (2000) 
found that research recommendations have included providing tactile stimulation in surfaces and wall 
hangings. Different spatial configurations have also been trialled to enhance the engagement of people 
with dementia in activities.
Specific multisensory interventions seem to have some limitations. Baker et al. (2003) compared a 
30-minute individual multisensory stimulation session with a 30-minute individual activity session in a 
randomised controlled trial. There were 136 participants who had moderate-to-severe dementia. Multi-
sensory stimulation was no more effective than activity in changing behaviour, mood or cognition in the 
short or long term. However, the impression was gained that participants who were less cognitively able 
enjoyed the multisensory sessions more and those who were more able had a preference for the activity 
sessions. This highlights the importance of matching sensory stimulation to the needs and functioning 
of the person with dementia.
Other formats have had greater success. Gigliotti, Jarrott, and Yorgason (2004) selected horticultural 
activities designed to stimulate all five senses. For example, in one activity participants made herbal 
heat pads. Participants were attendees at a day centre and had a mean MMSE score of 17 (score range: 
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2-27) and attended an average of 16 horticultural therapy activity sessions. Compared to traditional ac-
tivities, horticultural tasks generated more positive affect and participants were engaged in productive 
behaviours for more of the time.
Finally, some interventions have targeted a specific sense. Topo et al. (2004) trialled a picture gramo-
phone multimedia program that worked in a similar way to a karaoke machine. While the music played, 
users saw the names of the songs and photographs associated with the music. Twenty-three participants 
were involved in the intervention evaluation. Unfortunately, MMSE scores were not available for 35% of 
participants. In the remainder of the sample, the majority of participants had mild symptoms of dementia, 
22% were in the moderate stage, and 9% in the severe range. Staff evaluations suggested the intervention 
had a positive effect on participant mood and social interaction. For instance, some participants appeared 
“visibly pleased” (Topo et al., 2004, p. 343) when using the picture gramophone and in group sessions 
some participants “sang together and swayed in time” (p. 344).
Performance Monitoring
It is important that people with dementia are able to evaluate their own performance accurately so that 
they can undertake their daily tasks safely and maintain their independence (West, Dennehy-Basile, & 
Norris, 1996). This also has implications for psychological well-being, as an overestimation of ability 
may result in task failure while underestimation may result in task avoidance. This can lead to a further 
loss of skills and confidence. Interventions can provide training designed to improve the accuracy of 
awareness at the performance monitoring level as a means to support effective coping (Clare, Marková 
et al., 2011). This could be a focus for cognitive rehabilitation interventions. The ongoing GREAT study 
(Clare, Bayer et al., 2013) aims to establish whether cognitive rehabilitation is effective for people with 
early-stage dementia. After goal identification, participants meet with the therapist for 10 weekly sessions 
and then receive four maintenance sessions over the following six months. In these sessions participants 
and their caregivers work with a therapist to devise and implement strategies for achieving personally 
relevant goals. The therapist introduces and models strategies, and the participant and caregiver work on 
the selected goal during the following week according to the agreed schedule of activities. This schedule 
helps participants monitor their performance and their progress towards their goal. On a weekly basis 
strategies are adapted and adjusted as necessary.
Evaluative Judgements
A similar approach can be taken for evaluative judgements. Inaccurate evaluative judgements, for ex-
ample, in which the person with dementia attributes forgetfulness to normal aging, are likely to cause 
caregivers concern and create practical difficulties. However, for the person with dementia this may be 
a way of coping and it would not be appropriate to confront these beliefs (Clare, Marková et al., 2011). 
Interventions can assist couples to negotiate common understandings which might facilitate the develop-
ment of effective coping styles. Evaluative judgements may change over time and so an effective strategy 
might be to provide support that facilitates developments in coping style. Support groups for people with 
early-stage dementia might be valuable in this process (Lodgson et al., 2010).
In the moderate-to-severe stages of dementia, when people are struggling to a greater degree with 
evaluative judgements and are becoming confused by situations, contextual cues and environmental 
support may be beneficial (Clare, Marková et al., 2011). A review by Day et al. (2000) contained several 
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examples of how physical environments have been adapted to enhance the functioning of people with 
dementia. How buildings are configured can assist people with dementia to orient and navigate, as can 
the use of landmarks and signage. Enabling people to see outdoor areas can help orient to time of day 
and season. For example, in one study cited by Day et al. (2000) the frequency of toilet use increased 
when toilets were visibly accessible (i.e., they could be seen to be vacant). Another study described in this 
review found that specially designed clothes closets that presented clothing in the appropriate sequential 
order increased autonomy in dressing. More recently, an investigation of 50 nursing homes found that 
with advancing dementia, people became increasingly dependent on a compensatory environment. One 
design recommendation was to ensure nursing homes had a circulation system with a straight layout so 
that residents were not required to change direction en-route (Marquardt & Schmieg, 2009).
Meta-Representations
As previously discussed, for some people with dementia it may not be appropriate to force them to reflect 
upon their experience of having the condition and discuss its implications; however, for others, it may 
be useful to have this opportunity in order to support meta-representations. This might be done through 
attendance at support or psychotherapy groups. Cheston, Jones, and Gilliard (2004) have explored how 
the narratives people with dementia share in therapy groups help them assimilate difficulties into their 
current self-representation. They provided a case study of a gentleman attending a 10-week psycho-
therapy group. Over the sessions, this gentleman was able to move from a representation (or awareness) 
of his memory difficulties as temporary to appraising his memory problems more accurately, and this 
transition was undoubtedly accompanied by increased feelings of hopelessness: “Well I do think that, 
that they’re going to get better. I know that it’s always been like that, that things look bad for you and 
then they get better” (Cheston, Jones, & Gilliard, 2004, p. 102; early session), and, “Today’s been the 
worst day of my life. I can’t do anything for myself at all” (p. 103; a later session).
Retained Sense of Self
A relatively recent review (Caddell & Clare, 2011a) found 10 intervention studies that aimed to improve 
or explored ways to support self and/or identity in dementia. Several of these interventions were based 
on the premise that stimulating memory would support a person’s identity. All of these studies reported 
some beneficial outcomes; for instance, participants had, in some cases, become more aware of their 
identity. None of the interventions resulted in deterioration in well-being, and most participants expressed 
interest, pleasure and involvement in the intervention, suggesting they enjoyed taking part. However, it 
was not possible to draw firm conclusions about intervention efficacy as little attention has been focused 
on how to target self-image or identity, or on how to measure such outcomes.
Self-1: The I
Throughout the journey of dementia people need to be acknowledged as autonomous individuals with 
their own views and preferences. This will validate self-1. Sensitively designed technologies may help 
compensate for identity loss by providing external memory and conversation aids (Massimi et al., 2008). 
Providing a social context in which the self is valued is particularly important because in dementia 
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the relational self may supersede the individual self (Herskovits, 1995). This means that people may 
be able to exhibit and retain more of their selves when interacting with others than when engaging in 
independent self-reflection.
Although self-1 can be considered a less complex and fluid representation of self than self-2 and self-
3, it still has relevance in early-stage dementia. People with early-stage dementia are often very aware 
of the stigma abut memory problems (Toms, Quinn, Anderson, & Clare, in press), and as noted in the 
introduction, this stigma can direct attention away from the fact that people remain unique individuals 
(self-1) with retained strengths and abilities (Herskovits, 1995).
The ongoing SMART study (Quinn et al., 2014) is a pilot randomised controlled trial of a group-
based self-management intervention for people with early-stage dementia. The intervention is based on 
Social Cognitive Theory (Bandura, 1986; 1997) which suggests that people’s adaptive behaviour is partly 
determined by their feelings of self-efficacy. Self-efficacy refers to an individual’s belief that he/she can 
successfully perform a specific action in a particular situation. Participants randomised to the interven-
tion are invited to attend eight weekly sessions, and facilitation techniques include enabling people with 
dementia to exchange ideas and coping strategies, participate in joint problem-solving, and share suc-
cesses. Although caregivers are present at the first and last sessions, for the remainder of the meetings 
people with dementia attend alone. Integral to the SMART intervention is the acknowledgement that 
people with early-stage dementia remain autonomous individuals with their own views and preferences.
Self-2: Attributes and Beliefs
Cohen-Mansfield, Parpura-Gill, and Golander (2006) explored ways of tailoring interventions according 
to the roles that participants considered to be part of their identity. They randomised 262 people with 
moderate-to-severe dementia (the mean MMSE score for the sample was 11) to either a control group that 
received regular social activities or an intervention group where interventions were designed to engage 
participants in interactions related to their role identities. For example, a male participant with a strong 
identity as a family man was encouraged to create a family tree using family photographs. Another man 
who had been an aviation engineer and had a strong professional identity was engaged in constructing 
a model plane. Cohen-Mansfield and colleagues found that participants allocated to the intervention 
group manifested more pleasure and interest during activities than those in the control group. They also 
seemed more involved in the activities and demonstrated less disorientation and agitation. During the 
intervention phase these participants also showed greater awareness of their identity.
Another intervention intended to support identity through technology has been trialled with Mr. H., 
a gentleman with moderate-stage dementia (Massimi et al., 2008). An automated, computerised biog-
raphy of his life presented in both sound and images was shown in his kitchen. This intervention was 
continued for four weeks. Mr. H. was said to have exhibited a stronger sense of identity following the 
intervention, and the computerised biography seemed to give Mr. H. a voice with which to assert his 
identity to others. Mr. H.’s daughter commented:
The fact that he’s enjoyed seeing his past and remembered it, and he feels quite proud of what he’s done. I 
think he feels he’s got a sense of pride in the past, which he had forgotten before. He’s reminded himself, 
in a way, of what he’s achieved, I think. (Massimi et al., 2008, p. 756)
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Self-3: Social Persona
Hedman, Hellström, Ternestedt, Hansebo, and Norberg (2014) explored how people with dementia po-
sitioned themselves by observing support group sessions and interviewing participants. The group they 
observed contained five people, all with moderate dementia. They found that the group predominantly 
affirmed how members represented themselves to the group and this strengthened sense of self. Group 
members were observed to present themselves in a variety of ways. All the participants told stories about 
their lives and other group members listened attentively to these and asked questions, thereby validating 
the person speaking in the assumed role of storyteller. Participants also presented themselves as morally 
concerned and supported each other as having such characteristics. One such exchange was:
Mr. L: It’s important to help the next guy.
Facilitator: We should all help each other - that’s important!
Ms. A: Yes, people need to help each other.
Mr. L: Yes, that’s Rule Number One. In any situation.
Ms. A: It’s good to help those in need, for there will come a day when we’re there ourselves, and no one 
will care about us. I’m not there myself yet, but even so.
Ms. G: And to listen to one another - that’s extremely important, I think. (Hedman et al., 2014, p. 16)
Other self-representations that were shared and then supported by other group members included the 
person burdened with dementia and the coping person. In representing themselves as a coping person, 
people positioned themselves as managing to live a good life despite having dementia:
Ms. A: For me, it has come on gradually, so I think, “Ok, so this is how it starts. I’ll just put it aside for 
the time being, and go out and do something nice.” [Laughter.]
Facilitator: Right on!
Ms. A: There’s no point trying to delve into a subject you really don’t understand.
Ms. M: No, better to just go for a walk.
Ms. A: Exactly.
Ms. M: Get some fresh air.
Facilitator: Get some fresh air.
Ms. M. and Mr. L: Yeah! (Hedman et al., 2014, p. 17)
Support groups do not necessarily need to meet face-to-face. Rodriquez (2013) looked at the post-
ings of respondents on an internet forum. Although the resource was sometimes used by caregivers, 
Rodriquez only considered the postings of people who self-identified as having dementia and inductively 
coded their messages into themes. He considered a total of 354 posts from 32 respondents. He found 
that respondents used the forum to seek solace from the online community:
When I come to these message boards I find such hope and understanding that I am not alone in what I 
am going through. Robert you are an inspiration to me. Mary, Joyce, Robyn thank you so much for all 
your sharing. No one knows how it is, and what I am going thru. I have been to support groups and that 
helps some but this better. (Rodriquez, 2013, p. 1220)
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Rodriquez (2013) found that some people used the forum to recover components of themselves that 
had seemed lost. The most pertinent example was the routine conversations that people were able to 
have online in comparison to the social isolation they reported experiencing offline. However, Rodriquez 
also provided the example of Henry, who had expressed a fear of going out alone. This received many 
postings from other users who made suggestions and provided encouragement. With this support, Henry 
did manage a shopping trip out, and posted, “It was good to find out that I can still do ‘normal’ things 
like a shopping trip” (Rodriquez, 2013, p. 1223).
The chance to maintain and perhaps develop new positive social personae can also be provided by self-
help and advocacy groups, such as DASNI. Such forums can provide a context for interactions through 
which selfhood can be constructed and maintained. In such groups, participants have the opportunity 
to enhance key aspects of themselves that they can present in social situations and this can strengthen 
their self-efficacy and self-esteem (Clare, Rowlands, & Quin, 2008). As respondents from DASNI com-
mented, “I could not do what I do or feel as I feel or lecture or even have accepted the disease if it were 
not for my DASNI family” (Clare, Rowlands, & Quin, p. 18), and,
I have gotten real down two times in the last four months. At that time it seems as though my failure in 
things I do is exaggerated many times. I feel as though my power has been lost to do anything about it. 
I feel helpless and hopeless. Thank God for my chat group DASNI sticking with me and helping me to 
crawl out. (p. 18)
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This chapter started by presenting multicomponent models of awareness and self which provide the 
basis for a detailed and nuanced understanding of these phenomena across the dementia trajectory. In 
early-stage dementia the extent to which awareness is maintained was emphasised and the association 
between cognitive decline and awareness was considered. The self in early-stage dementia was similarly 
considered. This incorporated an understanding of how awareness and identity are related and the impact 
of cognitive impairment on sense of self. However, the majority of the evidence suggests that people in 
the early stages of dementia retain a strong sense of self even though they perceive some changes oc-
curring, and there are many ways through which individuals and couples work to maintain sense of self. 
This section concluded by considering how awareness and identity impact psychological adjustment.
In the section on moderate-to-severe dementia, evidence was again presented that emphasised the 
degree to which elements and domains of awareness and identity can be preserved. This concluded with 
a consideration of how such understandings can improve caregivers’ perceptions of quality of life. The 
final section expanded on this theme of promoting well-being by providing an overview of the range of 
interventions that have promoted self and awareness across the dementia trajectory. This section also 
briefly noted considerations for future research.
In conclusion, we have reviewed evidence for retained awareness and sense of self and identity across 
the dementia trajectory. We have presented evidence that even in the severe stages of dementia people 
retain some awareness in specific domains, and some sense of self. There is substantial evidence that 
aspects of awareness and identity can be maintained across the dementia trajectory. This understanding 
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is important to consider when developing person-centred care; interventions need to promote the use 
of retained abilities and skills as these contribute to psychological well-being. One key challenge for 
clinicians is to identify when it is appropriate to promote awareness and how to support caregivers so 
that they understand the extent of awareness of the person with dementia (Clare, Marková et al., 2011). 
Research can continue to support and guide these clinical endeavours by adopting and continuing to 
explore a multifaceted model of awareness and self.
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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
AwareCare Trial: A trial funded by the U.K. Medical Research Council to use detailed observa-
tions to develop a tool that can be used to assess the degree of awareness shown by people with severe 
dementia, and to train care staff in the use of the AwareCare measure.
Awareness: A reasonable or realistic perception or appraisal of a given aspect of one’s situation, 
functioning or performance, or of the resulting implications.
Evaluative Judgement: The ability to evaluate symptoms, changes or impairments, performance, 
situation, or functioning (e.g., memory).
GREAT Trial: A large-scale randomised controlled trial, funded by the U.K. National Institute of Health 
Research Health Technology Assessment Programme, evaluating the efficacy and cost-effectiveness of 
cognitive rehabilitation for people with early-stage dementia. The full title of this study is Goal-oriented 
cognitive rehabilitation in early-stage dementia: multi-centre single-blind randomised controlled trial.
Meta-Representation: Complex reflection on one’s situation and the changes experienced (e.g., dete-
rioration of cognitive ability in dementia), self-reflection, and consideration of the perspective of others.
Performance Monitoring: The ability to monitor ongoing task performance on a specific task (e.g., 
a memory test) as it occurs, and identify errors.
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REACH Group: The Research in Ageing and Cognitive Health (REACH) group is based at the 
School of Psychology, Bangor University, U.K. Group members work with people in midlife to later 
life, with people who have dementia, and with caregivers. Their work focuses on maintaining cognitive 
health in later life and living well with cognitive impairment and dementia.
Self: Personal identity, attributes, life history, roles, and characteristics.
Sensory Registration: The most basic level of awareness, which involves the registration of basic 
sensory and perceptual information, reflecting the capacity for attentional resources to be directed to-
wards an object, leading to appraisal and/or behaviour response.
SMART Trial: A trial funded by the Welsh National Institute for Social Care and Health Research 
(NISCHR) that aims to find out how best to support people in developing the capacity for self-management 
in the early stages of dementia. The full title of this study is Self-management in early-stage dementia: 
a pilot randomised controlled trial of the efficacy and cost-effectiveness of a self-management group 
intervention.
